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In December 1772, Chief Justice Stephen Hopkins, who soon would be a revolutionary 
and would sign the Declaration of Independence, wrote to the English Privy Council that 
he and his fellow Rhode Islanders were “judges, under a peculiar constitution.”  
Explaining what he meant, Hopkins said that the “local situation”—that is, circumstances 
in Rhode Island—created a “necessary and unavoidable difference in our modes of 
practice, laws & customs.”  He assured the Council, however, that these differences were 
“not in any essential point whatever repugnant to the laws of Great Britain.”1  The central 
principle—that a colony’s laws could not be repugnant to the laws of England but could 
differ according to the people and place—bound all the American colonies.  This 
repugnancy principle became the basis of what I call the transatlantic constitution.  For a 
century and a half, this constitution developed as a continuous conversation among 
litigants, lawyers, legislators, and other legal participants over how and when the laws of 
England should apply in the colonies. While the empire that created the transatlantic 
constitution faded with the American Revolution, its legal culture survived to construct 
the skeleton of federalism and mold early national constitutionalism in the United States. 
This book is about the development of the transatlantic constitution in one particular 
colony, Rhode Island, and, of no less importance, the legal culture that grew up around it.  
Contemporaries did not call it the “transatlantic constitution.”  As Thomas Paine 
wrote in Common Sense (1776), the American colonies had a “constitution without a 
name.”  In choosing the phrase, I use the term constitution in a sense unfamiliar to some 
readers.  Through most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, constitution did not 
refer to a specific document or even a specific, known set of laws.  In certain situations, 
constitution carried the meaning of “that which is constituted,” an idea of the constitution 
as representing an almost anthropomorphic, organic body politic, with its history, 
geography, social and cultural composition, and well-being.  At other times, constitution 
related to more specific laws, principles, customs, and institutions, but here again, not to 
a discrete group of laws. The transatlantic constitution encompassed the political 
structure of the English empire in North America (the dual authorities of England and the 
colony); the central legal arguments legitimated by this structure (the principles of 
repugnancy and divergence); the determinative underlying policy (the effective 
functioning of the English empire); and the accompanying practices (such as the Privy 
Council’s review of colonial acts and hearing of colonial appeals).2  
                                                 
1 Letter of Stephen Hopkins, et al. in Freebody v. Brenton (Dec. 1772), PC 1/60/10. 
2 For an excellent discussion of early understandings of constitution, see Daniel Hulsebosch, “The 
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and History Review 319-326 (1998); Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 
2     The Transatlantic Constitution 
This transatlantic constitution existed as both an unwritten and written 
constitution.  As an overarching arrangement of authority, it was unwritten, located in the 
history and purpose of the English empire in America.  Nevertheless, specific boundaries 
were written into the colonial charters. The 1663 Rhode Island charter articulated the two 
central principles—repugnancy and divergence: 
[T]he laws, ordinances and constitutions [of Rhode Island], so made, be 
not contrary and repugnant unto, but as near as may be, agreeable to the 
laws of this our realm of England, considering the nature and constitution 
of the place and people there. 
First, the colony was an extension of the realm of England.  Colonial laws, therefore, 
could not be contrary or repugnant to the laws of England. As the Board of Trade wrote 
in the 1730s: “All these colonies . . . by their several constitutions, have the power of 
making laws for their better government and support, provided they be not repugnant to 
the laws of Great Britain, nor detrimental to the Mother-Country.”  Repugnant carried a 
broad set of cultural meanings including being contrary, contradictory, inconsistent, 
incompatible, and oppositional, as well as eventually also connoting strong dislike or 
aversion.  Second, however, law and government should relate to the people and the 
place.  Colonial laws thus only needed to be “agreeable” or, in the words of the Rhode 
Island charter, “as near” to English laws as “may be” “considering the nature and 
constitution of the place and people there.” In short, colonial laws could diverge for 
colonial circumstance so long as they were not repugnant to the laws of England.  The 
repugnancy and divergence principles linked the organic and legal notion of constitution.3   
* * * 
The transatlantic constitution cast a shadow over this country’s constitutional 
founding and early national period.  Its existence helps to explain the rapid acceptance of 
federalism and judicial review of state legislation and the profound theoretical problems 
with judicial review of congressional action.  The transatlantic constitution, with its 
principles of repugnancy and divergence, remains deeply embedded in American legal 
culture.  We see it in our commitment to federalism as a conversation between dual 
authorities and our desire to have clear constitutional prohibitions and fuzzy areas of 
divergence.  We hear it in our endless debate over whether the written constitution can be 
read as a living constitution that should change with a changing vision of the nation. We 
speak it when we maintain our commitment to dialogue in which the laws of the states 
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are reviewed for conformity with the laws of the United States. The transatlantic 
constitution was our first constitution; it shaped the new country and in surprising 
respects continues to define the nation we share today. 
